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BOOK REVIEW
PRIVATE
PROPERTY
AND THE CONSTITUTION
by Bruce Ackerman. New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977. Pp. ix, 303. $4.95.
Reviewed by John A. Humbach*
As the country becomes more densely populated, the pressure increases for greater state intervention into decisions involving land
use. Principally, this intervention takes one of two forms: Either the
state acquires property rights in the land and then controls its use
like any other owner of an interest in land, or the state makes rules
limiting the freedom of private owners to control the use of their
respective parcels.
To private owners, the most striking differencebetween the two
forms of state intervention is that the first (property-acquisition)
constitutionally requires a payment to the person from whom the
property is taken, while the second (rule-making) does not require
payment.' This difference is obviously important from the private
owner's point of view. If the state must make payments to a particular property owner, the taxes paid by all property owners .may be
higher as a result. On the other hand, if such payments are not made
to the owners of the land which is the subject of state intervention,
they stand to lose much, unless the adverse effects to them are offset
by other benefits of some sort.
Of course, the offsetting benefits need not be in cash. For example, when the state intervenes by rule-making, a loss of land-use
potential may be more than compensated by the advantage of having one's neighbors subject to the same new restriction^.^ However,
this type of compensation is more problematic because its "worth"
* B.A. 1963, M i m i University (Ohio); J.D. 1966, Ohio State; Professor of Law, PG
University School of Law.
1. The requirement of compensation for takings of property by the federal government
is based upon the "just compensation" clause of the fsth amendment to the Constitution:
"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compenaation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The requirement has also been made applicable to the states, and comparable
requirements are of course a part of most if not (by interpretation) all state constitutions.
See NICHOLS,
EMINENT
DO- 68.1[2](1976).
2. It is not meant to suggest that any sort of parity is required between value lost and
value gained, or indeed that any requirements a t all of the "just compensation" clause
necessarily apply to rule-making interventions. However, the possibility of "built-in" offsets
can be understood as one justification for denying cash compensation in cases of rule-making.
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to the recipient is far less certain than a sum of money. Thus, when
the state intervenes in land use decisions, the affected owners are
likely to want money. But money is only available if there has been
a "&king" of "property" within the meaning of the Con~titution.~
Hence, what is and what is not such a "taking" is a very important
question.
It is perhaps surprising then that many observers consider the
question to have been poorly answered in judicial decisions applying
the "just compensation" clause of the Con~titution.~
Led by the
articles of Sax5 and Mi~haelman,~
a number of attempts recently
have been made to provide some sensible basis for determining
when just compensation is or ought to be required. The method has
tended to be less descriptive than prescriptive: the author first develops a model of just-compensation law, rational and coherent to
his satisfaction, and then critically evaluates the existing law in
terms of his model.
Now, Bruce Ackerman has come forward with what is clearly
calculated to be a major contribution to the debate. However, the
debate to which he contributes is less clear. For rather than attempt
to resolve the just compensation controversy, or to tie off some of
its loose ends, he seems to take off in the headlong pursuit of an
entirely different inquiry: What is the proper methodology for courts
to use in selecting rules for the adjudication of cases?
He correctly notes that the style of decisionmaking almost necessarily affects the outcome of a decision.' However, if the rationalization of just compensation law must await a general (and correct)
agreement of how courts should decide cases, the wait may be long
indeed. Presumably, Ackerman did not intend such a pessimistic
conclusion, for the tone of the book is, in large part, quite the
opposite. What he apparently did intend was to portray in fair
detail two basic approaches to deciding just compensation
cases-one contrived and essentially untried, and the other historically predominant. The contrived mode of decision is described by
3. For quotation of relevant language of Constitution, see note 1 supra.
4 . See note 1 supra.
5. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALEL.J. 36 (1964); Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Public Rights, 81 YALEL.J. 149 (1971).
6. Michaelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1165 (1967).
7. B. ACKERMAN,
PRIVATE
PROPERTY
AND THE CONSTITUTION
21-22 (1977) (hereinafter
cited as ACKERMAN).

Heinonline

39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 794 19771978

19781

BOOK REVIEW

795

Ackerman as Scientific Policymaking; the historically predominent
mode is called Ordinary Obser~ing.~
The two rest.their claims to
validity on quite different philosophical underpinnings. Hence, the
choice between them becomes a question of one's own philosophy
about such things. Ackerman's own preference for Scientific Policymaking, if it is not immediately clear from the names which he has
selected for the two approaches, certainly becomes clear a short
distance into his analysis.
In distinguishing between judges who are Scientific Policymakers and those who are Ordinary Observers, the test is whether the
judge has committed himself to a kind of political-legal
Weltanschauung, referred to by Ackerman as a Comprehensive
vie^.^ To qualify as a Scientific Policymaker, "one must learn to
think of the legal system as if i t were organized around a selfconsistent [and fairly small] set of abstract principles that comprise the system's ComprehensiveView."lo Thus, the Scientific Policymakers start by selecting a Comprehensive View and then proceed to decide cases in accordance with it. On the other hand, the
Ordinary Observer, who sees social reality as too complex for any
single normative view, seeks to apply the various norms which appear to correspond to existing social expectations.ll In short, the
Ordinary Observer tries to decide cases the way that most people
would expect him to decide them.12
The most appealing aspect of the Scientific Policymaker's
methodology is that it purports to bring, via the Comprehensive
8. See id. a t 10-22.
9. Ackerman recognizes the possibility of a diversity of possible Comprehensive Views
and does not make the adherence to any particular View a test of whether one is a Scientific
Policymaker or an Ordinary Observer. See id. a t 11.
10. Id. a t 90. (Emphasis deleted). See id. a t 11 and especially id. a t 197-98,n. 21 for a
discussion of the idea that a Comprehensive View should involve a "relatively small" number
of abstract and general principles.
11. Id. a t 12-15.
12. The other difference between Ordinary Observers and Scientific Policymakers, or
between Ordinary and Scientific decisionmakers in general, concerns the matter of vocabulary. Thus, an Ordinary decisionmaker will prefer resort to ordinary (non-lawyer) talk for an
understanding of the meanings of words, whereas a Scientific decisionmaker will regard such
resort "as the surest sign of muddle." See id. a t 10-11.For the legal Scientist, a sophisticated
body of legal conceptions can be expressed only with a rather closely defined set of terminology, and the fact that such terminology happens to have homonyms in ordinary talk is a
matter of no relevance to their legal meanings. See id. a t 26-28.
For example, Ackerman emphasizes the distinction between "social" property and
"legal" property. The former is property as understood by the layman, while "legal" property
is a term of art applicable to some of the legal relationships recognized to exist between people
with respect to things. See id. a t 26-29,116-18.
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View, a self-consistency and philosophical justifiability to the law
which common law casuistry seems to lack. But the key question of
exactly how the Scientific Policymaker should select the Comprehensive View which will monocratically govern us all is one which
Ackerman frankly avoids.13 He does 'specify that it is the state's
Comprehensive View, not the individual judge's, which should be
controlling.14Beyond this we are told nothing explicitly,15though we
are given a hint. In his apology for demurring on this point, we are
told that we have "a most remarkable scene" to consider merely by
looking a t the "powerful forces in our present legal culture-to explore the basic tensions in our existing legal system through an
exploration of the compensation clause of our existing Constitution."l8 In context, the implication is that a suitable Comprehensive
View is likely to be found in the rich diversity of our existing constitutional heritage. The hint is, however, confusing. In selecting the
Comprehensive View, he seems to suggest that the Scientific Policymaker act pretty much like an Ordinary Observer.
Following Ackerman's lead, and putting aside the central issue
of how to select the operative Comprehensive View, we may wonder
whether there is any conceivable Comprehensive View which might
reasonably be expected to find acceptability in American legal circles17 and also plausibly account for a system of just compensation
rules. Ackerman offers Comprehensive Views of two kinds, which he
calls Utilitarian and Kantian.18 Because both of these general categories offer endless possibilities for specific, actual views,19 Ackerman wisely avoids defining either of them too closely. Thus, Utilitarianism is represented as the philosophy dedicated to maximizing
"something-or-another-that-sounds-like-So~ial-Utility.~'~~
Kantian
13. Id. a t 41. It is somewhat disconcerting that he ducks the issue, given the havoc
which misplaced ideological commitments have caused in this century alone.
14. Id. a t 182.
15. Implicitly, I think, Ackerman shows substantial partiality towards a t least one or
the other, perhaps an amalgam, of the two Comprehensive Views which he deals with in detail
in the book. See text accompanying notes 20 and 21 infra for a brief summary of the two.
In any case, he pays no attention to the theocratic Comprehensive View despite its
important historical following, nor to the View which holds that "private property is theftw-a
COMMUNIST
view which was the late specter haunting Europe. See K. MARXand F. ENGELS,
MANIPESTO
1, 80-86(Washington Sq.Press Ed. 1964). Adoption of the latter Comprehensive
View would make easy work of the "just compensation" conundrum.
16. ACKERMAN
a t 42 (Emphasis in original).
17. See id. a t 86.
18. Id. a t 41-42& 71-72.
19. Id. a t 42 & 71.
20. Id. a t 42.
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philosophies are those which accept the Principle of Exploitation:
people are not merely the means to the end of maximizing Social
Utility but are, instead, ends in themselves-in short, there are
things which are "wrong" to do to a person no matter how much
good would result to others or to society in general.21From these
scant definitions, Ackerman adumbrates the two different Scientific
systems of just compensation rules which they would respectively
imply.
In reading the demonstration of how Scientific Policymaking
might work based first upon Utilitarian, then the Kantian Comprehensive Views, there is little that will be strange to anyone who has
read Michaelman's 1967 article on the ~ubject~~-little
that is
strange, that is, other than the vocabulary. It is somewhat like
reading a familiar poem in a recently learned foreign language.
In fairness, Ackerman's stated objective was to "develop a technical v ~ c a b u l a r y "to~deal
~ with "the fundamental substantive problems raised by the compensation clause, as they are seen by contemporary Legal Science."" But the question still remains whether all
that new vocabulary is necessary to illuminate the main distinction
in his thesis-between Ordinary Observing and Scientific Policymaking.
One particularly wonders about the effort to identify and label
the various ways in which judges may either be "restrained" or
"innovative" in reaching their decisions: conservative vs.
r e f o r m i ~ tdeferential
,~~
vs. activist,26or principled vs. p r a g m a t i ~ t . ~
Of course, these fundamental differences in the ways judges view
their own roles can affect decisions, and the resulting effects can be
just as radical as differences in the judge's Comprehensive View.
21. Id. a t 72.
22. Michaelman, note 6 supra. A good deal of the work of Sax, note 5 supra, is also
a t 50-56.
recounted. ACKERMAN
23. ACKERMAN
a t 25.
24. Id. a t 26. Also, in fairness, Ackerman acknowledges a t great length his indebtedness
to Michaelman. See id. a t 209, where he admits that his "scholarly tokens do not measure
the full compensation that would be due in a well-ordered academy."
To his vast credit, Ackerman does not, like so many legal scholars, plod to rediscover
the wheel, "proceeding as if the legal world were forever new." Id.
25. With regard to wealth distribution, a "conservative" would tend to favor the status
quo, and a "reformist" would see the need for some redistribution. Id. a t 37.
26. A "deferential" judge would have greater confidence in the legislature and other
organs of government and hence defer to them more often than the freely second-guessing
"activist." Id.
27. The "pragmatic" judge would tend to favor litigants who are expected to be sore
losers. "Principled" judges would not. Id. a t 37-38.
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Indeed, it is hard to understand how a person's view of the judicial
role can be sensibly separated from his truly comprehensive Comprehensive View.28A Comprehensive View which does not comprehend one's view of the judicial role is not really comprehensive at
On the other hand, if there is any special relation between
these political-science considerations and just compensation law as
such, that relation is not clear. Indeed, Ackerman himself practically drops the distinctions from further consideration when he
moves on to his discussion of the Ordinary Observer approach.30
Mainly, Ackerman uses his various restrainedlinnovative distinctions to show that the statistical correlation between choice of
Comprehensive View and outcome of cases may not be that great
after all, i.e., the choice of Comprehensive View-at least as between the two choices he discusses-is only one of several, and perhaps not even an especially important determinant of case outcomes. In doing so, however, Ackerman raises a point which should
cause a t least momentary distress to anyone convinced of the superiority of the Scientific Policymaking approach: there appears to be
no practical Scientific way for individual judges to select between
the competing models of the judicial role.31Thus, every "Scientific"
decision must be importantly affected (and hence infected) by a
quite un-Scientific determinant. It is like developing a perfect substantive law and then having the trials by battle.
What, then, does the book tell us about "private property and
the Constitution?" We learn first of all that the decided cases in the
"just compensation" area do not seem to be reconcilable with any
identifiable, broad, but strictly followed ideological commitment
(Comprehensive View).32We are also told that, if the courts deliberately and carefully did adhere to any one ideological commitment,
. ~ ~ of
the "just compensation" cases would be more c ~ n s i s t e n tNone
this is new, but singing the praises of Scientific Policymaking resurrects a dangerous temptation that is very old: the temptation to
sweep away the chaos of pluralism and replace it with the streamlined efficiency of political monism.
28. Cf. id. at 205, n. 2.
29. Furthermore, it may be noted that one must have a Comprehensive View that
accepts judges as Scientific Policymakers before one is in a logical position to consider what
kind of Comprehensive View ought to underlie narrower policies.
30. ACKERMAN
at 106-10.
31. Id. at 205, n. 2.
32. Id. at 13.
33. Id. at 11-15.
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Inconsistency in our laws is a price we pay for tolerating political diversity. So long as there are variations in people's views (Comprehensive Views or otherwise) there will be political diversity, and
so long as we are unwilling to ascribe ultimate "correctness" to any
particular view, such diversity must be permitted.34Thus, it does
not signal an inadequacy in the judicial process that the "just compensation" cases (or any other body of cases) cannot be reconciled,
but it is a sign rather that access to our law-making process is open
to all, including those who may have dissident or minority Comprehensive Views.
Ackerman no doubt correctly identifies the tendency in modern
decisionmaking to seek the policies to be served by law outside the
body of the law itself-a turn to purpose-oriented decisions, or return to naturalism or, in any event, a turn away from the inward
looking formalism of the preceding century. This looking outside the
law for the law's policies is the essence of Policymaking. However,
instead of seriously evaluating this trend or demonstrating its dangers (especially when combined with Ackerman's monistic version
of "Science"), Ackerman seems to embrace i t uncritically as the
antidote to the unscientific "policy-following" approach of the fairly
recent past. It may go too far to see Scientific Policymaking as a
form of crypto-autocracy, but undoubtedly judicial dedication to a
single Comprehensive View leaves little place for dissenters from
that View.
Apart from these substantive difficulties, two other matters
should be mentioned. One is Ackerman's unconventional and sometimes confusing use of capital letters. Certainly, when pains have
been taken to define terms critical to an analysis, it surely helps the
reader if those terms are distinguished by capitals whenever they
later appear.35However, when a generic term, "Layman," is first
defined as the name of a hypothetical person and then later is
capitalized and used in its generic sense, the result is simply confusing.36In contrast, certain words are capitalized for no apparent reaEfficien~y,~~
Legal S c i e n ~ eLaw
,~~
son at all-e.g., Highly
34. This last assertion reflects my Comprehensive View which holds that there is no
"correct" Comprehensive View save, of course, that there is no "correct" Comprehensive
View.
35. Thus, there can be no quarrel with Ackerman's use of capitals for such terms as
Ordinary, Scientific, Observer, and Policymaker, all carefully defined. ACKERMAN
at 10-20.
36. Compare ACKERMAN
at 97, with, e.g., ACKERMAN
at 123, 147 or 151.
37. Id. at 11.
38. Id. at 42 & 184.
39. Id. at 26.
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of Just Compen~ation,~~
Social Utility4' and Utilitarian42-giving the
impression that they carry greater import than they in fact do.
Another objection is that the book is used as a forum for airing
non-germane viewpoints which are obviously dear to Ackerman but
which offer little concerning the main subject matter. For example,
Ackerman-who has been known to talk (privately) of the rights of
fi~h~~-spends
over two pages44on the question of whether "wellsocialized" laymen ought to be taught that "Nature" and
"Tradition" have rights too. Although he ignores the intriguing
question of whether local birds, foxes, etc. are entitled to be paid
"just compensation" when a new dam floods their habitat, he does
claim to have "come upon one of the deeper legal paradoxes" of the
environmental revolution: the restoration of Nature to its proper
place means the triumph of A r t i f i ~ eIncidentally,
.~~
as may be seen
in the preceding usage of capitalization which follows that of the
book, this is another area where Ackerman has had difficulty keeping his shift-key under control.
All in all, however, the book is a t the very least a handy recapitulation for anyone who wants to get a deeper understanding of the
recent thinking about "just compensation" law. Certainly, watching
Ackerman disappear into pitfalls will assist others to avoid them.
But the book is perhaps most important for the insights which it
offers concerning the more general sort of jurisprudence or political
philosophy. The two become, in discussions such as these, very
close. By identifying the Scientific Policymaking mode of deciding
cases, he warns us of its dangers. By demonstrating some of the
incongruities produced by Ordinary Observing, he has warned
against being entirely satisfied with that approach to law as well.
But what are we to choose? Scientific Observing? Ordinary
Policymaking? Ackerman raises both of the possibilities but dismisses them.46Perhaps there really is no fully satisfactory approach.
Some, however, may be worse than others.
40. Id. a t 29.
41. Id. a t 42.
42. Id. a t 144 & 172.
43. As reported in a letter to this reviewer dated September 7, 1977 from Stephen P.

Dresch, Research Director of the Institute for Demographic and Economic Studies, Inc.,
confirming earlier conversations.
44. ACKERMAN
a t 155-56 & 262-64.
45. Id. a t 156.
46. Id. a t 17-20.

Heinonline

39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 800 19771978

